In this paper, we empirically assess by means of the local projection method, the impact of different types of financial crises on a variety of pollutant emissions categories for a sample of 86 countries between 1980-2012. We find that financial crises in general lead to a fall in CO2 and methane emissions. When hit by a debt crisis, a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related activities or industrial processes. During periods of slack, financial crises in general had a positive impact on both methane and nitrous oxide emissions. If a financial crisis hit an economy when it was engaging in contractionary fiscal policies, this led to a negative response of CO2 and production-based emissions.
Introduction
The eruption of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its contagion to the real economy has reopened the well-known debate on the compatibility between economic development and environmental protection but has also led to a wider discussion on the usefulness of environmental policies and actions within countercyclical packages. The fall in economic activity due to the GFC did lead to reductions in energy consumption and, thus, carbon dioxide emissions (particularly those related from fossil-fuel combustion and cement production). 1 More importantly, in contrast with the oil price crises of the 1970s, the GFC did not lead to a structural change in the growth path of emissions in the years that followed (Peters et al., 2011) . 2 In fact, after a modest decline of On the one hand, drops in emissions often provoke claims from climate sceptics that worries over global warming are exaggerated. On the other, increases in emissions lead to concerns among environmental groups that not enough is being done to address the issue. 4 Against this background, the Paris climate accord in 2015 -the so-called COP21 -was a landmark effort on the part of countries to set and monitor commitments to mitigate global warming. 5 Subsequently, the COP23 in 2017 in Bonn "sought to maintain the global momentum to decouple output from greenhouse gas emissions" (Gough, 2017).
This paper empirically assesses the impact of (financial) crises on pollutant emissions. To this end we rely on Jorda's (2005) local projection method to trace the short to medium-term impact of crises on emissions. A perusal of the literature reveals no such study in a systematic and comprehensive way. We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we look at the role played by different types of financial crises (systematic, non-systematic, banking, currency or debt) on a variety of emissions split either by gas nature or sector of activity. Second, we account for the prevailing macroeconomic and fiscal conditions at the time of the crisis in affecting the response of emissions. Third, we cover a large sample of 86 countries split between 31 advanced and 55 emerging and low-income countries between 1980-2012. Finally, we employ recent and state of the art econometric techniques that have several advantages relative to alternative approaches as discussed in section 3.
Our results show that financial crises in general led to a statistically significant fall in CO2
and methane emissions. Moreover, when hit by a debt crisis, a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related activities or industrial processes. Splitting the sample, we find that, in normal times in advanced (developing) economies, systemic and banking crises resulted in a fall in methane, nitrous oxide and production based GHG (CO2) emissions. 5 Leichenko et al. (2010) used the GFC as an example of the close linkage between globalization and climate change. Amann et al. (2009) provide estimates of greenhouse gas mitigation potentials and costs in different countries. They employ the IIASA's Greenhouse gas-Air pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model. These types pf models have been applied before to identify cost-effective air pollution control strategies, and to study the co-benefits between greenhouse gas mitigation and air pollution control in Europe and Asia (Hordijk and Amann, 2007; Tuinstra, 2007) .
During periods of slack, financial crises in general had a positive and statistically significant impact on both methane and nitrous oxide emissions. Under strong economic conditions however, financial crises (weakly) led to the reduction of various types of emissions, but the effects were not always precisely estimated. If a financial crisis hit an economy when it was engaging in contractionary fiscal policies, this led to a negative and statistically significant response of CO2
and production-based emissions. Furthermore, CO2 emissions reacted negatively after banking and debt crises and a loosening of the fiscal stance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly review the scarce literature on the topic of financial crises and emissions. Section 3 describes our data and presents some descriptive statistics and Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 5 discusses our main results and the last section concludes.
Literature Review
Carbon dioxide, the major greenhouse gas, has been shown to fluctuate with economic situations and to be highly correlated with GDP and energy consumption (Gierdraitis et al., 2010; Lane, 2011 In addition, York (2012) demonstrated that the response of emissions to an increase in income was greater during economic expansions than during contractions. Instead of taking a modelling approach and projecting the trajectory of CO2 emissions depending on the stages of the business cycle, this paper explores the asymmetry nature of the crisis-emissions nexus empirically looking at a large panel of countries and years. Sobrino and Monzon (2014) looked at the environmental effects of the Global Financial Crisis in Spain and found that it has led to a reduction of transport activity and higher energy efficiency on the road. They further inferred that countries tend to be more efficient in a crisis that in prosperity. Declercq et al. (2014) , who investigated the impact of recessions on CO2 emissions in the European power sector from 2008 to 2009, suggested that the lower demand for electricity during recession periods was the most important factor for carbon emission mitigation.
These studies however seem to mix the short versus the long-term implications of financial crises for the environment. For some, despite short-term reductions in emissions in crises years, economic crises in general are not good for the environment. The main argument is that, contrary to what many would expect, economic recessions, by making access to capital more difficult, negatively affect emissions reduction efforts through their discouraging effects on investments in general (including investments in low-carbon technologies) (Del Río and Labandeira, 2009). 7 As 7 Investors will tend to prioritize less capital-intensive technologies, i.e., investments with lower up-front costs and shorter pay-back periods. This makes low-carbon capital-intensive technologies (such as renewables or nuclear energy) a less attractive option with respect to other technologies (such as combined cycle) which, in turn, has consequences for future target-compatible emissions (and concentrations) trajectories.
both governments and the private sector focus on the recovery and on adapting their respective budgets, they shift priorities away from climate policies. In this sense, crises tend to lead to deferment and postponement of environmental projects and investment as surviving the crisis and recovering becomes the aim, rather than becoming a "green" company or economy. More importantly, at a time of economic crisis, carbon lock-in is more likely. 8 Depressed aggregate demand, the fall in the prices of some goods and lower economic capacity may encourage the consumption of goods with an inferior environmental quality (and lower prices) and to an overexploitation of resources with associated environmental degradation effects (Del Río and Labandeira, 2009). Moreover, lower energy prices in times of crisis, reduce the economic viability for the development and operation of cleaner technologies. Furthermore, governments are likely to avoid burdening business and industry with extra costs and regulation at a time when the economy is fragile and jobs may be at risk (Wooders and Runnalls, 2008) . This assumes, nonetheless, a low political will to implement climate policy in the short term and a reduced incentive to participate in international agreements to tackle the issue in the longer term.
There are, however, other people that advocate the opposite, i.e., that crises provide an opportunity for developing and investing in low-carbon technologies that, in turn, could provide a way out of the recession (Greenpeace, 2008) . According to this view, given the long lifetime of most energy infrastructures and technologies, the opportunities provided by crises to replace carbon-intensive technologies by cleaner alternatives should not be missed. According to Papandreou (2015) crises can open up opportunities for new institutional pathways if the forces 8 Carbon lock-in refers to the difficulty to shift the economy and technological systems into a low-carbon path. Whereas traditional economic approaches emphasize the role of existing physical infrastructures and the long age of the capital stock in key sectors (energy production and transport), more recent "evolutionary" approaches consider a wide array of sources of carbon lock-in, including economic and non-economic barriers to changes in complex technological systems (Unruh, 2000; Marechal, 2007) .
they unleash give rise to changes in existing norms, regulations and institutions. 9 Crises throw existing paradigms into new critical light. 10 In fact, given the greater competition for scarce resources, economic crises should strengthen the case for a suitable design of climate policies which lead to cost-effective emissions reductions in an intertemporal perspective. 11 Proponents of this view then call for clear, long-term and stable policy frameworks and more international cooperation. This paper empirically aims to test the two conflicting propositions: whether crises
give rise to an increase or decrease in emissions. As to whether these originate and propel the use of greener technologies it is a matter of relevance that goes beyond the scope of the paper.
Empirical Methodology
The empirical analysis consists in estimating and tracing out the average evolution of various suited to estimating nonlinearities in the dynamic response. 9 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) provide a sweeping account of the development of nations over millennia and how different crises or historical contingencies were often turning points that could substantially alter the trajectory of a country, locking them into a virtuous cycle of prosperity or sometimes having the opposite effect. 10 Geels (2013) frames the relationship between the financial crises and sustainability transitions within a multi-level perspective (see also Geels 2002; Van Bree et al., 2010). 11 While typically crises have both economic and social costs, the benefits of greener policies (e,g. Germany´s Energiewende) while also initially costly, must be weighted in present discounted terms against the potential savings and benefits (positive externalities) they can generate. Such cost-benefit analyses imply a number of ah-hoc assumptions and are beyond the scope of this paper. We thank an anonymous referee to raising this point.
The first regression specification is estimated as follows: 12 While the presence of a lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects may in principle bias the estimation in small samples (Nickell (1981) ), the length of the time dimension mitigates this concern. Note that the finite sample bias is in the order of 1/T. While the number of lags was chosen to be 2, results remain qualitatively unchanged to alternative lag structure specifications (refer to section 5.b -Sensitivity).
We are aware of alternative ways of estimating dynamic impacts but, as we explain, those are inferior options. The first possible alternative would be to estimate a Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR). However, this is generally considered a "black-box" since all relevant regressors are considered endogenous. Moreover, one has to know the exact order in which they enter in the system. Since economic theory rarely provides such an ordering, the Choleski decomposition is often used as a solution of limited value for providing structural information to a VAR. Moreover, a major limitation of the VAR approach is that it has to be estimated to low A second alternative of assessing the dynamic impact of financial crises would be to estimate an Autoregressive-Distributed-Lag (ARDL) model of changes in inequality and consolidation episodes and to compute the IRFs from the estimated coefficients (Romer and Romer, 1989; and Cerra and Saxena, 2008) . Note that the IRFs obtained using this method, however, tend to be lag-sensitive, therefore undermining the overall stability of the IRFs.
Moreover, the statistical significance of long-lasting effects can result from one-type-of-shock models, particularly when the dependent variable is very persistent, as are emissions (Cai and Den Haan, 2009 ). Contrarily, in the local projection method we do not experience such issue since lagged dependent variables enter as control variables and are not used to derive the IRFs. Lastly, estimated IRFs' confidence intervals are computed directly using the standard errors of the estimated coefficients without the need for Monte Carlo simulations.
In the second specification, the dynamic response is allowed to vary with the state of the economy: . The main reasons for identifying the state of economy using real GDP growth instead of the output gap are that the latter is unobservable and subject to substantial and frequent revisions, as well as that estimates of output gaps are typically surrounded by great uncertainty. In the robustness checks section, we present the results based on an alternative measure of economic slack (output gap computed via the recent Hamilton (2017) filtering approach). M is the same set of control variables used in the baseline specification, but now including also two lags of ( , ).
Equation (2) is also estimated using OLS and the same assumptions as in equation (1) apply.
This approach is equivalent to the smooth transition autoregressive model developed by Granger and Terävistra (1993) . The advantage of this approach is twofold. First, compared with a model in which each dependent variable would be interacted with a measure of the business cycle position, it permits a direct test of whether the effect of crises varies across different regimes such as recessions and expansions. Second, compared with estimating structural vector autoregressions for each regime it allows the effect of crises to change smoothly between recessions and expansions by considering a continuum of states to compute the impulse response functions, thus making the response more stable and precise. This estimation strategy can also more easily handle the potential correlation of the standard errors within countries, by clustering at the country level. 13 
Data and Issues

Emissions
We use data aggregated by the World Resources Institute (WRI), which includes GHG emissions by gas and economic sectors. GHG emissions rely on a gas aggregation method that includes carbon dioxide (CO2) and non-CO2 emissions, such as methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases (F-gases), converted based on their 100-year Global Warming
Potential (GWP-100) according to the IPCC's 2nd Assessment Report. We do not include GHG 13 The standard errors of the estimated coefficients discussed below are even smaller if we allow for correlation in the standard errors across countries and cluster at the time period level.
emissions from Land-use and Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in our baseline results,
given the discrepancies between FAO data and what countries report to the UNFCCC. With the exception of CO2 for which we have longer time series -starting in 1980 -all other emission series begin in 1990. CO2 produces eight times less greenhouse effects than methane. However, with a focus on the concentration, among Carbone dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the CO2 has the biggest impact on global warming. Moreover, whereby methane 14 Our results are robust even with the inclusion of LULUCF.
naturally breaks down relatively quickly in the atmosphere, the lifespan of CO2 exceeds the first one. As a result, in order to further inspect the relevance of financial crises in affecting CO2
emissions, we resort to IEA categorization into CO2 stemming from electricity and gas, from manufacturing, from transportation and from other fuel combustion. These series also go back to 1980. 
Financial Crises and Other Data
Event Study of Crises and Emissions
In Figure 1 we do a simple event-study exercise in which we plot the average level (in logs) of different types of emissions during, before and after a financial crisis. We do so by splitting the sample by country groups to inspect more closely heterogeneity given the underlying fundamental differences in economic structures and stages of development. In the first row we observe that financial crises to not seem to affect much the level of CO2 in Advanced Economies, but they increase in developing countries during t+1 and t+2. In Advanced Economies GHG emissions increase in the year of the crisis but they quickly return to lower levels afterwards. All other graphical results provide an unclear picture supporting the case for a serious econometric inspection that will follow. horizon expands). Magnitudes are non-negligible: a financial crisis can lead to the fall of up to 4 percent in CO2 emissions after 2 years (and slowly reducing to a fall of about 2 percent after 6 years). 15 The fall in both CO2 and methane emissions is particularly sizeable when non-systemic crises take place (top right panel). Turning to different types of crises, CO2 emissions also respond negatively and significantly following banking crises (a fall of up to 6 percent in these emissions in the medium-term), while methane and fluorinated gas react positively and significantly following debt crises (an increase of about 12 percent in these emissions in the medium-term). In all remaining cases, confidence bands do not allow us to state unequivocally that crises positively or negatively impacted a specific type of emissions. From this point onwards, only those IRFs yielding statistically significant results are show for reasons of parsimony (the full set of results is nonetheless available from the authors upon request). The previous set of unconditional effects mask, however, considerable variation depending on business cycle conditions, as shown by the OLS estimation of equation (2) reported in Figure 3 .
During periods of slack, financial crises in general seem to have a positive and statistically significant impact on both methane and nitrous oxide emissions (reaching about a 7 percent increase after 6 years). The reverse is true in good times (more so for the nitrous oxide), but the magnitude is not symmetric to that of bad times. Systemic crises that hit a country undergoing economic difficulties are associated with larger CO2 and production-based GHG. As for the type of financial crisis that seems to have larger impacts, yet again, debt crises are associated with increases in production based GHG emissions irrespectively of the phase of the business cycle.
Also, methane, F-gas and nitrous oxide react positively in the short to medium-run following debt crises that take place during bad economic times. Under strong economic conditions however, financial crises seem to mildly lead to the reduction of various types of emissions, but the effects are not always precisely estimated.
We also redid the previous analysis by focusing instead on economic sectors instead of gas nature. Such results are displayed in Figure A1 in the Appendix. They show that when hit by a debt crisis, a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related activities or industrial processes. These effects are potentially large in the medium term and statistically different from zero. In addition, relying on longer CO2 series, Figure A2 shows that carbon dioxide emissions emanating from manufacturing (transportation) decrease (increase) following a financial/banking (systemic) crisis. In Figure 4 , left hand side panel, we observe that systemic and banking crises result in a fall in methane, nitrous oxide and production based GHG emissions in advanced economies in normal times. When we condition by the state of the economy, most types of crises (with the exception of currency and debt ones) are associated with a rise in emissions from CO2 and production based GHG during periods of economic slack, but their decline during booms. Effect of Banking Crises our findings, equation 1 was re-estimated by excluding country fixed effects from the analysis.
The results (not shown but available upon request) suggest that this bias is negligible (the difference in the point estimate is small and not statistically significant).
As an additional sensitivity check, equation (1) was re-estimated for different lags (l) of the variables in the X vector. The results for zero lags, one lag and three lags (not shown but available upon request) confirm that previous findings are not sensitive to the choice of the number of lags.
Robustness to the identification of slack
As an alternative variable measuring economic slack to use in the ( ) function that enters equation 2, we have employed an output gap measure. Despite substantial progress in the estimation methodologies to calculate potential output, there is still not a widely accepted approach in the profession. According to Borio (2013), two alternative approaches to estimate potential GDP are used: i) there are univariate statistical approaches, which consist of filtering out the trend component from the cyclical one; ii) there are the structural approaches, which derive the estimates directly from the theoretical structure of a model. Aware of the shortcomings of using either one or the other 16 , and at the cost of not maximizing the total number of observations in our panel dataset, instead of relying on the IMF's WEO measure of output gap 17 , we rather apply the recent filtering technique developed by Hamilton (2017) . In addition, we are also mindful of the criticisms surrounding the use of the popular Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (such as the identification of spurious cycles), particularly in the context of a large sample of very 16 Statistical methods suffer from the end-point problem, that is, they are extremely sensitive to the addition of new data and to real-time data revisions. Structural models, on the other hand, may be difficult to implement consistently in cross-sectional environments and rely on the imposition of pre-determined assumptions. 17 The IMF does not have an official method for computing potential output and every country desk decides which measure fits best. While the most common IMF approach uses a production function approach, assumptions vary greatly across countries and discretion is left to the country desks.
heterogeneous countries (Harvey and Jaeger, 1993; Cogley and Nason, 1995). Hamilton's (2017) approach to extract the cyclical and trend component of a generic variable t x (denoted t c x and t x  , respectively), consists of estimating:
where
The non-stationary part of the regression provides the cyclical component:
while the trend is given by
Hamilton (2017) suggests that h and k should be chosen such that the residuals from equation (3) are stationary and points out that, for a broad array of processes, the fourth differences of a series are indeed stationary. We choose h = 2 and k = 3, which is line with the dynamics seen in real GDP. Results of re-estimating equation 2 using the newly computed output gap as measure of slack, are displayed in Figure A3 in the appendix. We can see that while there are some similarities there are also some insightful differences with respect to the IRFs presented in Figure 3 . We still get a positive (but weaker in significance) effect of financial crises in bad times on methane emissions. the differences are that CO2 emissions decline in times of economic strain after a financial crisis (particularly non-systemic and banking ones). Moreover, production based GHG emissions always reactive positively and significantly following a debt crisis irrespectively of the state of the economy. Finally, methane and nitrous oxide emissions increase after a debt crisis that hits the economic during periods of slack.
Does the prevailing fiscal stance matter?
The response of emissions to financial crises may also depend on whether the government is engaging in expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy at the time the economy is hit. To our knowledge, the only paper relating fiscal policy and the environment is the one by Lopez et al.
(2011). The authors model (and empirically test) the impact of fiscal spending patterns on the environment and find that there is a reallocation of government spending composition towards social and public goods that tend to reduce pollution when an economy is hit by a negative shock.
They further conclude that increasing total government spending (that is, engaging in expansionary fiscal policy) without altering its composition, does not reduce polluting emissions. while our setting is not identical, we still aim to shed further light into the effects of crises on the environment conditioning on prevailing (at the time of the shock) fiscal conditions. To this end, we consider an alternative version of equation 2 where instead of the state of the economy, we use instead an indicator of fiscal policy stance. The indicator fiscal policy stance is a government consumption shock, identified as the forecast error of government consumption expenditure relative to GDP (for a similar approach see, e.g., Gorodnichenko 2012, 2013; and Abiad et al., 2015) . 18 Here, δ = 1 is used to assess the role of the fiscal policy. 19 Figure 6 shows the results. Financial crises hitting an economy when it is engaging in contractionary fiscal policies, leads to a negative and statistically significant response of CO2 and production-based emissions. In contrast, after systemic (non-systemic) crises that take place in periods of fiscal relaxation, production based GHG (CO2) emissions go up (down) in the medium term. Furthermore, CO2 emissions react negatively after banking and debt crises and a loosening of the fiscal stance. Finally, currency crises that take place at times of fiscal retrenchment lead to a fall in both CO2 and production based GHG emissions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided empirical evidence on the impact of different types of financial crises on pollutant emissions for a sample of 86 countries between 1980-2012. We relied on the local projection method to plot the impulse responses of a variety of emissions categories (by type of gas and economic activity) to financial crises.
We found that financial crises in general led to a statistically significant fall in CO2 and methane emissions. CO2 emissions responded negatively and significantly following banking crises, while methane and fluorinated gas reacted positively and significantly following debt crises.
Results also showed that production-based emissions increased following debt crises. Moreover, when hit by a debt crisis, a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related activities or industrial processes. More specifically, CO2 emissions emanating from manufacturing (transportation) decrease (increase) following a financial/banking (systemic) crisis.
When we split the sample, we observed that, in normal times in advanced economies, systemic and banking crises resulted in a fall in methane, nitrous oxide and production based GHG emissions. In normal times in developing economies, systemic/banking (debt) crises resulted in a negative (positive) and statistically significant response of CO2 (production based GHG).
During periods of slack, financial crises in general had a positive and statistically significant impact on both methane and nitrous oxide emissions. Systemic crises that hit a country undergoing economic difficulties were associated with larger CO2 and production-based GHG.
Debt crises were associated with increases in production based GHG emissions irrespectively of the phase of the business cycle. Under strong economic conditions however, financial crises (weakly) led to the reduction of various types of emissions, but the effects were not always precisely estimated.
Finally, if a financial crisis hit an economy when it was engaging in contractionary fiscal policies, this led to a negative and statistically significant response of CO2 and production-based emissions. In contrast, after systemic (non-systemic) crises that took place in periods of fiscal relaxation, production based GHG (CO2) emissions went up (down) in the medium term.
Furthermore, CO2 emissions reacted negatively after banking and debt crises and a loosening of the fiscal stance.
For policy makers, it is important so see financial crises as opportunities to make big reductions in emissions that one can then lock in, and ensure that carbon prices, investments and other policies nudge us all toward innovations that in turn give the tools to be a low carbon society, with a business model that combines prosperity with responsibility. As there is no one size fits all when it comes to policy implications (depends on development stage, initial conditions, current policy and institutional setting, political economy concerns, etc.) it is difficult to elaborate on country specific implications. This paper´s findings reinforce the need to improve economic and financial resilience to shocks as a way to prevent certain types of emissions to rise (as a result of a financial crisis). Hence, focus on macroprudential preventive regulation is a necessary component, while simultaneously countries with fiscal space should promote fiscal policies that support greener technologies (tax rebates, subsidies, deductions, etc.) so that the productive structure slowly transforms itself into a less pollutant one (with clear environmental sustainability positive externalities). Effect of all Financial Crises 
